Pricing to Market when the Exchange Rate Changes by Paul Krugman
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
PRICING TO MARKET WHEN
THE EXCHANGE RATE CHANGES
Paul Krugman
Working Paper No. 1926




This paper was prepared for the AEI Conference on Real-Financial
Linkages, Washington, January 30-31, 1986. The research reported
here is part of the NBER's research program in International
Studies. Any opinions expressed are those of the author and not
those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.Working Paper #1926
May 1986
Pricing to Market When the Exchange Rate Changes
ABSTRACT
It has been widely remarked that US import prices have not fully
reflected movements in the exchange rate. This paper begins with an
investigation of the actual extent of "pricing to market" by foreign
suppliers. It shows that pricing to market is a real phenomenon, but not
universal; in particular, evidence on German export prices suggests that
stickiness of import prices is largely confined to machinery and
transport equipment. The paper then considers a number of possible
models. While the evidence is not sufficient to distinguishamong these







Ithas been widely remarked that the prices of many imports into
theUShave not fallen to the degree that one might expect given the
strong dollar. The most conspicuous examples have been European luxury
automobiles, whose US prices have in many cases actually risen in
dollar terms despite huge declines in European currencies against the
dollar. Since prices in Europe, in European currencies, have not risen
dramatically, theeffecthas been to create large differences between
prices of the same automobiles in the US and Europe. The price
differential in turn has given rise to "gray markets' in which
individuals and firms bypass normal distribution channels to import
automobiles directly from Europe.
The phenomenon of foreign firms maintaining or even increasing
their export prices to the US when the dollar rises maybe described
as"pricing to market" (PTM).Pricingto market is an interesting
subject for both practical and intellectual reasons. The immediate
practicalconcern is with the effects of a declining dollar on
inflation.While many economists expect a declining dollar to
contribute to a resurgence of inflation, some observers from the
business community have disputed this. They argue that foreign firms
did not cut their prices as the dollar rose, and that they will
maintain their pricing to market as the dollar falls. Thus these2
observers argue that the effects of a decline in theUS dollaron
import prices will in fact be small.
The intellectual interest of pricing to market is that it offers
evidence on the role of market structure in international trade. For
the past decade, theorists have been proposing new models of
International trade that stress imperfect competition and dynamic
aspects. These models have unfortunately often proved difficult to
test. The phenomenon of pricing to market, however, offers a possible
new piece of evidence. As I will argue below, pricing to market
properly understood almost certainly involves both imperfect
competition and dynamics, so that its apparent importance is a
confirmation of the practical importance of 'new wave' models of
trade. Furthermore, as we will see below, the importance of pricing to
market appears to vary widely across industries. This raises the
prospect that by correlating the importance of pricing to market with
industry characteristics we will be able to distinguish between
alternative unconventional trade models.
This paper does not pretend to offer either a full empirical
examination or a definitive analytical treatment of the phenomenon of
pricing to market. It is instead offered as a preliminary overview of
the subject. The paper begins with some rough evidence on the extent
to which pricing to market has actually occurred, and on the relative
extent of PTM in different industries. I then turn to some possible
theoretical models of PTM. The intention of this theoretical3
discussion is to be provocative rather than definitive; that is, I
offer a large batch of suggestive models (six in all) without
attempting to settle on any one as the right one.
I. Some Empirical Evidence
A. Conceptual issues
Before examining some admittedly rough empirical evidence it is
important to be more precise about what we mean by pricing to market.
In general, we mean that import prices fall "too little" when a
currency appreciates. This should not be taken to mean, however, that
PTM is present whenever import prices fail to fall in proportion to
the exchange rate appreciation. For a large country like the United
States, a less—than—proportional response of import prices to the
exchange rate is not in general surprising, and need not lead us to
look for exotic explanations.
The best way to define when PTM is and is not occurring is to
consider an example. Suppose that we measure the real exchange rate
using unit labor costs, and that the US experiences a real
appreciation in this sense against both France and Germany. For
simplicity, let us in fact take nominal unit labor costs as fixed in4
each country. Suppose also that France exports wine to the US, and
Germany exports BMWs. Wine is traded on an arms—lengthbasis by
middlemen who are prepared to arbitrage any international price
differences; BMW shipments are arranged by the manufacturer, who
therefore sets c.l.f. prices in each market rather than simply setting
a single f.o.b. price in Germany.
Now even though the law of one price will apply to wine, we would
not be too surprised if the dollar price of wine fails to fall as much
as the US real appreciation. As French wine becomes cheaper inthe US,
we will buy more; if the US market is a significant share of French
demand, this will drive up the price of wine in francs. The price of
wine will not fall as much as the real dollar rises, but the price of
French exports to the US will not rise relative to the prices on
domestic sales or exports to Germany. This is an example of a case in
which the import price appears to fall "too little", yet we would not
want to call this a case of pricing to market.
By contrast, suppose that BMW decides for some reason to keep
both its dollar prices in the US and its mark prices in Germany
constant. In this case the price of BMWs will certainly not fall as
much as the dollar rises, but that is not the distinctive point. What
would be striking would be that prices of autos in Germany and prices
of German exports to France would fall relative to export prices to
the US. Indeed, if the prices diverged far enough there would be an
incentive for individuals to bypass BMW's distribution channelsand5
create a gray market. This is the situation that I have in mind when
discussing pricing to market.
Notice that when we look at aggregate price indices it does not
matter whether the import price effects of an exchange rate change are
dampened by garden variety supply and demand considerations, as in the
case of wine, or by noncompetitive pricing practices, as in the case
of BMWs. The reason for distinguishing PTM is analytical and
microeconomic. We understand the competitive model of traded goods
prices pretty well (although empirically the behavior of commodity
prices in response to exchange rate changes is rather puzzling; see
Dornbusch 1985). Thus I focus instead on what seems harder to explain,
pricing to market that involves divergent movements in different
markets.
The implication of our distinction is that the usual way in which
price effects of exchange rate changes are assessed, by comparing some
price change directly with an exchange rate movement, will not do in
this case. We always need to compare the price change with some
measure that takes into account any effect of the exchange rate on
world prices of the imported good, so that we can exclude these
effects from our measure of PTM.
I have attempted to measure the extent of pricing to market using
three kinds of comparison. (Unfortunately, in all cases the price data
are unit value indices rather than true price indices. The problems
with these measures are well known,butthere do not seem to be better6
numbers). The first is a comparison of aggregate US manufactures
import prices with a 'predicted" import price index using export
pricesof majorUS trading partners The second is a comparison of
Germany's prices on exports to other EC countries with her prices on
extra-European exports. The third is a comparison of prices of German
exports to the US and to the rest of the world.
B. Aggregate US manufactures import prices
The first comparison is shown in Figure 1. Three series are
shown. First, we show how the actual unit value of US manufactures
imports changed from 1980 to 1984. This measure of the import price
rose imperceptibly, by 0.5 percent, over the period. Second, we show a
"predicted" US import price. This is an average of the manufactures
export unit values in dollars of Canada, Japan, the European
Community, and developing countries, weighted by their shares in US
imports in 1980. This index fell by9.2percent from 1980 to 1984.
Finally, for reference we include the US manufactures export unit
value, which rose 21 percent in four years.
To interpret these series, suppose that each country exported
only a single manufactured good, and that this good were sold at a
single world price ——i.e.,that there were no pricing to market. Then
we would expect the aggregate US import price index to fall in
proportion to our "predicted" price index. The extent to which this
fails to happen can then be interpreted as our measure of PTM.Clearly, US manufactures import prices fell "too little", by 9.7
percent. If we use the divergence between US and trading partner
exportprices ——30.5 percent ——asa measure of therealexchange
ratechange,then PTM was 9.7/30.5 =.32of the real exchange rate
movement.
C. Aggregate German eçports
Figure 2 shows our, second comparison. It makes use of the
convenient fact that Germany reports separate unit value series for
trade with other EC countries and trade with the rest of the world.
This is useful, because during the first half of the 1980s Germany had
fairly stable exchange rates against most of the EC, while the ecu
depreciated sharply against the dollar and to a lesser extent the yen.
Two series are shown, both for finished manufactures. First, we
show the ratio of import unit values from EC countries to those from
outside the community. This series can serve as an indicator of the
extent to which the mark depreciated more in real terms relative to
the world at large than it did relative to the EC. By 1984 this
measure had declined by 9.4 percent. This is not as large a change as
in the case of the US, so that problems of measurement error become
even more acute. Nonetheless, there is some evidence of PTM.8
The evidence is contained in the second series, which compares
German export unit values to the EC with those on exports to the rest
of theworld.This series shows a decline of 2.5 percent. If Germany
did notengagein any pricing to market (and if the price indices for
EC and rest of world exports were truly comparable) this number should
be zero. Clearly we do not want to lay too much stress on this number,
which is within the bounds of measurement error. For what it is worth,
however, the implied extent of PTM is 2.5/9.4 =.26,which is not too
inconsistent with our results for US import prices.
D. German—US trade
Our last evidence is shown in Figure 3. Here an attempt is made
to compare the movement of German export prices to the US with prices
to other countries from 1980 to 1983. Again if Germany did not engage
in any pricing to market (and if the price indices were comparable)
these movements would be identical.
To construct these numbers, the following procedure was used.
First, unit values were constructed for German three—digit SITC
exports to the US and to all other trading parteners for both 1980 and
1983. Then "price indexes" were constructed by applying these unit
values to the bundle of three—digit export quanta that Germany
exported to the US in 1980. That is, the measures are supposed to9
measure what the 1980 bundle of US imports from Germany would have
cost if the US had been able to buy these imports at the prices other
countrieswere paying. These indexes were calculated both for one—
digit categories and for German manufactured exports asa whole. The
weaknesses of this method are severe enough to make us treat the
results with great caution. Nonetheless, it is interesting to have a
look, however crude, at the disaggregated pattern of pricing to
market.
Let us consider first however the aggregate change. The German
price index for manufactured exports to the US, in dollars, appears on
our calculation to have fallen by only one percent from 1980 to 1983.
(The mark fell by 29 percent in nominal terms). Meanwhile, the price
of the same bundle of exports to other countries fell in terms of
dollars by 14 percent. This gives us a PTM divergence of 13 percent.
Over the same period, US export un-it values, as reported in
International Financial Statistics, rose 33 percent relative to
Germanys. so thattheextent of PTM maybeestimated at 13/33 =.39
--anumber again reasonably consistent with our estimate for US
aggregate imports.
When we look at the data by single—digit SITC, the basic result
seems so dramatic that it is hard to discount, the limitations of the
data notwithstanding. This is that PTM, instead of being comparable
across sectors, in fact occurs in only one sector, machinery and
transport equipment. In this sector the export price to the US10
actuallyrises bypercent, while the price to other countries falls
by 12 percent. Admittedly this is a large sector, hut PTM is absent in
otherlargeGerman export sectors such as chemicals and basic
manufactures. Thisselectivityof the occurrence of pricing to market
is one of the things that we would like our theoretical analysis to
explain.
E. Summarizing the evidence
Our examination of the data may be summarized as saying two
things. First, pricing to market when the exchange rate changes is a
real phenomenon: both our examination of aggregate US import prices
and our data on US-German trade suggest that more than 30 percent of
the real appreciation of the dollar was reflected in a divergence
between prices of US imports and prices of the same goods in other
markets. Second, however, PTM is not universal. Our disaggregated US—
German evidence seems to say that pricing to market is limited to the
transportation equipment and machinery industries.
We should note that the evidence does not support the extreme
claims some have made about the failure of exchange rate changes to be
reflected in import prices. A good deal less than half of the rise in
the dollar was reflected in a divergence between US and foreign prices
of US imports. This is because pricing to market seems to be selective11
across sectors, and perhaps also because even when it occurs it is not
complete.
Onthe other band ,theextentof PTM is ci ea1v enough to he
significantformacro analyses. That willnot, however, be the concern
of this paper. Instead, Iwill nowturn to the microeconomic question:
How can we explain pricing to market?
II. Theoretical Analysis: Static Models
Inourtheoretical discussion of the pricing tomarket
phenomenon,we will consider a series of models. These models fall
into two classes, first are static models. What I mean by a static
model in this context is a model in which the beliefonthe part of
firms that the dollar's rise is temporary does not play any role in
theirpricing behavior. That is, in these static models the pricing to
marketwould last even ifthe real appreciation of thecurrency were
expected to remain unchanged indefinitely. It seems a priori unlikely
that a static approach would be adequate here, but it makes sense to
consider the simplest option first.
Then we will turn to dynamic models. In these models it is
assumed to be crucial that the dollar's rise is taken to be temporary.
That is, in these models foreign firms are for some reason pricing12
based ontheirexpected long run costs rather than on their
temporarily low Costsduring a period ofa strong dollar. The point is
ofcourse toexpia in whythe firms shouldadopt such a long run
pricingrule.
Let us begin, however, with the static models. Three such models
will be considered. First is simple supply and demand. It will become
clear that this model cannot account for the key phenomenon of
divergent prices, but it is still illuminating to consider what it can
explain. Second. we consider monopolistic price discrimination. This
model turns out to he somewhat in its implications. Finally, we turn
to a simpleoligopolymodel. This has some nice features, but is
ultimately implausible as an explanation of what we observe.
A. ply and demand
The supply—and--demand model of the price implications of exchange
rates goes back at least to Haberler (1949), and has recently been
restated by Dornbusch (1985). Thus it needs only brief restatement
here. We imagine a world of two countries, US and EC, and two
currencies, dollar and ecu. Let Pbethe dollar price of some US
importable. P" the ecu price, e the number of ecus per dollar. Also
let S(P), S*(P*) be the supply from each region, while D(P) and D*(P*)
are the demands. Then equilibrium may be described by two equations.
First, we have world market clearing:13
(1) S(P)S*(P*) -0(P)—fl*(p*)=0
Second, we have thelawof one price:
(2) P =eP
Equilibrium and the effects of a dollar appreciation may be
illustrated as in Figure 4, which follows Dornbusch. Clearly a dollar
appreciation, while it lowers the dollar price, raises the ecu price.
Thus the dollar price does not fall in full proportion to the
appreciation. Obviously this depends on the US being a large country:
specifically, the elasticity of the ecu price with respect to the
exchange rate is
d(S —0 S—D*)/dP
Thus the extent to which import prices will fall "too little"
will be equal to the US share in the response of world excess demand
to price. Since the US is a large country. if the failure of import
prices to fall as much as the dollar has appreciated was the only
puzzle, the simple supply—and—demand model might be sufficient.14
What this model cannot explain, however, is the pricing to market
phenomenon of divergence between prices of goods sold to the US and to
other markets. Indeed, equation 2, byassertingthelawof oneprice,
rules this out by assumption. That is, this analysis can explain why
the dollar prices of Volvos and BMWs fail to fall in proportion to the
dollar's rise, but it cannot explain why these prices have fallen in
Europe relative to the US (that is, literally, a fall in P relative
to eP).
To explain such price divergence, we would have to add another
element: we would have to have some kind of specificity of supply to
the US market. Suppose, for example. that there were an upward—sloping
supply curve for transportation of importahies to theUSmarket. Then
the law of one price would be replaced with a new relation of the form
(2') P* =eP-t
where tismarginal transport cost, and is increasing in the volumeof
US imports:
(3) t =t(D—S)
Without working this out in full detail, we can immediately see
how this would work. A rise in the dollar would be accompanied by a
fall in the US price, and thus a rise in US imports. The rise in15
imports would however be associated with a rise in marginal
transportation costs, and thus with a widened wedge between US andEC
prices.
There are, however, several problems with a formulation like
this. First, how plausible is it to suppose that marginal
transportation costs are strongly upward sloping? Surely we would
imagine that given time the supply of transportation is highly
elastic. There could be short—run bottlenecks ——butthis then brings
us into the issue of dynamic response, which we will deal with in the
next section. Also, this formulation does not account for the
specificity of the pricing to market: why should marginal costs of
transport of machinery and transport equipment be much more steeply
upwardsloping than those for other manufactures?
A possible answer is that what matters are not transport costs
per se so much as other costs such as marketing and distribution.
These could be highly specific to a particular set of products, and
arguably might be more important for autos than for other goods. The
marketing and distribution issue is, however, inevitably a dynamic
one; thus we reserve fuller discussion until next section..
B. Monopolistic price discrimination16
We turn next to the possibility that pricing to market can be
exulained bymononolistic pricediscriminationTomake the point most
c]earJy, letus assume that a monopolistic firm can sell either in the
US or the EC, and that it has a constant marginal cost in ecus.




where c is marginal cost in ecus, andEand E* are the elasticity of
market demand in the US and EC respectively. E and E* may of course
depend on P and P*.
If P does not change, neither will E*, the elasticity of demand
in the EC market. Thus P is invariant to e. The question is whether a
rise in e will produce a more or less than proportional change in P.
This question corresponds exactly to a morefaniiliar question in
the recent theoretical literature on protection under imperfect
competition: namely, will a tariff be partly absorbed by foreign
firms? As Brander and Spencer (1984) among others have shown, the
result depends on the shape of the demand curve. Clearly, if the
demand curve has constant elasticity, the US price will fall in full
proportion to the exchange rate change. In order to get pricing to17
market, we must have a fall in the elasticity of demand; that is, the
elasticity of demand must be increasing intheprice (sothatit falls
as the price falls).
Unfortunately this means that the predicted behavior of a
monopolist depends crucially on the shape of the demand curve ——or
more accurately, on the monopolist's perception of the shape of the
demand curve. We might hope to put some bounds on what can happen by
looking at the two most popular assumed demand curves, constant—
elasticity and linear. The problem is that these hounds are very wide
indeed. In the constant elasticity case we have already seen that
there will be nopricingto market. In the linear case, on the other
hand, the percentage fall in the US price will always be less than
half of the percentage exchange rate change. Let E be the intial
elasticity of demand, with the monopolist facing linear demand
schedules; then we can show that the elasticity of P with respect to e
is (E —l)/2E,which is always less than 0.5.
In principle, then, price discriminating monopoly can explain
pricing to market if demand curves have the right shape. It is
disturbing to rely so heavily on the shape of demand curves, however.
Surely we would prefer to have shifts in the perceived elasticity of
demand result from some more fundamental cause. One possibility is
that such shifts arise from shifting market share in an oligopolistic
market, which we consider next.18
C.
Suppose now that the European firm, which still has constant
marginal ecu cost of c, faces a US competitor with constant dollar
marginal cost c. How will this affect pricing?
Let us assume in this case that the firms compete in Cournot
fashion, each firm taking the others deliveries to the market as
given. Also, to isolate the new element added by imperfect
competition, let us assume constant elasticity of market demand, so
that there would be no pricing to market by the European firm if it
did not have to face a domestic competitor (for an ana'ysis in the
linear case, see Dornbusch (1985)).
The basic rule of Cournot competition in the constant elasticity
case is that a firm will face a perceived elasticity of demand equal
to E/s, where E is the market elasticity and s is the firmss market
share. Let s be the market share (in the US market) of the US firm,
and s =1-sbe the market share of the EC firm. Then the pricing
rules of the two firms will be
(6) p =cE/(E—s)
for the US firm and19
(7) P =c*E/e(E—s*)
for the EC firm. In equilibrium, market shares must he such that these
two pricing rules coincide.
To see the implications of (6) and (7), consider Figure 5. The
higher is the import market share, the lower the elasticity of demand
perceived by the foreign firm and thus the higher its price for any
given marginal cost. Similarly, the higher the import share, the
higher the elasticity of demand perceived by the domestic firm and
thus the lower the domestic firm's price.
Now suppose that e rises. The foreign firm's pricing schedule
will shift down proportionately to this change. Its actual price will
however not fall by as much, because its market share will rise and
thus its perceived elasticity of demand will fall. Algebraically, we
can take logs of both (6) and (7):
ln(P) =ln(cE)—ln(E—s)
=ln(c*E)—ln(e)—ln(E—s*)
Differentiating and substituting, we get
ds =—dln(e)(E—s*)(E—s)I/(E—s*)+(E—s)]20
for the change in the US share of output, and
UIn(P=—dln(e)(E—s*)/[(E - s)—CE
—s*)]
for the change in the price. I.e., the elasticity of the price with
respect to the exchange rate will be less than one.
We should note, however, that this result depends crucially on
two unrealistic assumptions. First, we are assuming that the domestic
andforeignfirm produce perfect substitutes. This is empirically
unreasonable for the industries in which we actually seem to see PTM;
thosemanufacturing sectors in whichGermanandUS goods would seem
likely to be near—perfect substitutes, such as chemicals and basic
materials, show no evidence of PTM in practice. Second, competition is
assumed to be Cournot in form. Obviously Bertrand competition will
lead to a collapse of either imports or domestic production in the
perfect substitutes case.
A more realistic model, then, would be one in which the firms
produce differentiated products, and probably engage in Bertrand
competition. The general point here is that there is no general point:
whether the perceived elasticity of demand of the EC firm rises or
falls depends on the particular functional form, bringing us back to
the problems of the discriminating monopolist.21
III. Dynamic_Models
The models described in the last section were static in the sense
that neither the actual nor the expected duration of the exchange rate
change affect the extent of pricing to market. That is, the extent to
which import prices fall is independent of whether the dollar has just
risen or has been high for a number of years, and is also insensitive
to whether the current strength of the dollar is regarded as permanent
or soon to be reversed. intuitively this seems implausible. The extent
of pricing to market in the US is often regarded as being due at least
partly to the belief of foreign firms that the dollar will fall again
in the not too distant future. In this section I present three models
that offer possible rationalizations for the idea that import prices
will fail less than proportionately to the exchange rate change when
that change is either unanticipated or expected to reverse. The first
of these models stresses dynamics that arise from the supply side. The
second asks whether slow adjustment of demand to the market price will
give rise to a slow adjustment of the price itself. Finally, the third
attempts to justify price stickiness by a concern of firms for
reputation.
A. Sulv-sidedvnamjcs22
Iour i SOUSsi on of the supp I v-ad—oenianciapproach to import
prices itwas pointed out that increasing marginal transportation
costs could explain a failure of import prices to fall as much as one
might expect following an appreciation. I suggested, however, that
marketing and distribution costs were more likely candidates than
transport costs per se, especially given the apparent disparity in the
extent of pricing to market across sectors. It was also suggested that
upward—sloping marginal cost inthiscase was more likelyto be a
short—runphenomenon thanapermanent feature. Whatwewould liketo
do, then. is to formalize the idea that pricing to market canresult
fromtemporary bottlenecks to changing import volume.
To do this, let us return to the model of a price discriminating
monopolist introduced in the last section, but make one change: we
will now suppose that the monopolist has costs to changing deliveries
to the market. We might imagine, for example, that foreign auto
manufacturers cannot expand their sales without also providing an
expanded sales, distribution, and service "infrastructure'. To expand
this infrastructure is costly, and presumably more costly the more
rapid the attempted expansion. Suppose that the dollar rises suddenly.
Then there will be no point in cutting prices immediately if there is
no capacity to meet the expanded demand. Instead, we would expect
prices to fall gradually as the infrastructure is put in place.
Furthermore, if the dollar's rise is seen as temporary, foreign firms23
will not see it as worth their while to expand the infrastructure much
+j: i phSrthis approach says that the degree ofpoIc:
marketShOuld dependboth how recentI theexchange rate has changed
ond on how long the change is expected to last.
We can model this formally as follows. There is an EC firm that
sells a good in the US market. It faces a demand curve which we write
in inverse form:
() P P(x)
where x is the rate of deliveries to the US market. If we want tomake
aclean separation of the dynamic reasons for pricing to market from
the static ones we considered above, we can assume that the demand
curve has constant elasticity.
The EC firm's costs will be assumed to consist of two parts.
First. there is production cost; marginal production cost will be
taken to be constant in ecus. Second. we will attempt to capture the
dynamic aspects of marketing and distribution by assuming that there
are costs to adjusting the level of US sales. i.e., an adjustment cost
which is increasing in the deviation of dx/dt from zero. Let us write
this adjustment cost as h(dx/dt): then the firms instantaneous
profits will be
(9) V =Px/e—cx—h(dx/dt)24
t1o f wj 111 want t ( dn it rr.izethTurn
discounted va]ue of V. Probi ems of this sort are by now familiar in
many parts of economics (see for example Sargent (197?)), so it should
not be necessary to rework the solution. Instead, let us simply review
the basic characteristics of the outcome. The most useful way to think
about the problem is to regard the firm as placing a shadow price on
output: if this shadow price is positive, it will expand output, if it
isnegative itwi]icontract. The evolution of this shadow price
itself uepends on themarginalprof itabilitvof anincrease in x. The
optimal solutiontakes the form ofa saddlepath.
Sumpos€ thatwenow shock this system by changingthe exchange
rate e. The result depends on how permanent the shock is assumed to
be.Figure 6 illustrates how the price of imports would behave
following a permanent and a temporary exchange rate change. In the
case of a permanent appreciation the price would fall only gradually
as x rose. in the long run finally failing by the full amount of the
appreciation. iflthecase ofatemporary appreciation the price would
not only begin rising again after the exchange rate returned to its
Intlal level. it would fall moreslowlyfrom the start, and might
actually begin to rise before the exchange rate reversal.
Allowing for costs of adjustment. then, can rationalize pricing
to market. The extent of PTM in this case turns out to depend both on
how long the appreciation has lasted and on how persistent it is25
expectedto be These are reasonable things to inc]ude iii our model,
ccc nrrI;ihJv cootdencf tThthis p]rin.tIo
wouidouut however,whether it s sufficient Inparticularf the
divergence ofprices between the US and EC markets is wholly due to
marginal costs of distribution etc., how do we explain the emergence
of gray markets, that is, of individuals bypassing the normal
distribution channels? To explain this would seem to require that this
model be supplemented with some additional considerations affecting
thE'pricingdecision.
B. Dynamics of demand
Another possible route to a dynamic account of pricing to market
might he to appeal to slow adjustment of demand. Suppose that there
are lags in the effect of price on demand. Then a firm's pricing
decision will in effect have an investment—like component. trading off
lower profits now for higher sales later. It seems intuitively
reasonable that when the lags are long pricing will be dictated by
long—run cost rather than short run fluctuations.
Somewhat surprisingly, this intuition is by no means easy to
confirm. Analyzing optimal pricing under lags in demand is in general
fairly difficult, but the main points can be conveyed with a two-
period example. This example gives some presumption that transitory2
exchange rate shocks will have less effect on prices than permanent,
butit isno morethana presumption
Consider a Foreign firm that plans to sell a good in the US over
two periods. In the first period it faces a demand in the
second a demand D2(p1,p2), where subscripts refer to periods. Marginal




where R is a discount factor.
The question we need to answer is whether the price in the first
period will fall more if the exchange rate rises in both periods than
if it rises only in the first period. That is, will an exchange rate
appreciation that is regarded as temporary have less effect on hte
price than one that is regarded as permanent? What writing out the
model in this way shows is that this question is equivalent to asking
whether an increase in e will lead to a fall in F,
2
Theanswer to this question hinges on how the second period
appreciation affects the incentive of the firm to keep its first
period price down. We note that the derivative of second period





The first term in square brackets here is the cross elasticity of
demand; the second term is second period profits themselves. The
directionof theeffect of e2 on the price inthefirst period can be
determined by asking how the size of this expression is affected
holding P1 constant: if it increases in absolute value, there will be
an increased incentive to hold down the first period price.
What we can say definitely is that the second term will increase:
a rise in e will definitely increase second period profits. If we
could assume that the cross elasticity of demand would remain
unchanged, then we would be sure that a rise in second—period e would
lead to a fall in first period P. Unfortunately, we cannot be sure of
this. Here as elsewhere in our analysis, the answer seems to be
contingent on functional form.
C. Reputation and Pricing28
We have now seen that an ad hoc model of dynamic demand, in which
a5ei reeLpricerare s1mplasurne1] te aft ert the
quantity sold, provides only a presumption that pricing to market will
be profitable. On wonders, however, whether some less ad hoc
formulation of demand dynamics might give a clearer reason for a
failure to pass cost reductions on in price reductions. As our final
theoretical model, I will suggest a particular version of dynamics
that could justify the stickiness of prices without appeal to
particular functional forms or arbitrary lags in price effects.
The basic idea is that purchase of imported goods is a two-stage
process. First, potential buyers must decide whether to put themselves
in the market for a product ——forexample, whether to visit the
showroom and test—drive a particular firm's automobiles. We must
presume that putting oneself into a market is costly, and will be done
only if the price is expected to be sufficiently attractive. Second,
those in the market must then decide whether in fact to purchase, and
how much to buy.
The effect of this two—stage process will be that demand depends
not only on the actual price but on the price that customers expect to
pay when they decide whether or not to put themselves in the market.
The question then is how the expected price gets determined. In
practice, the way this seems to happen is that firms cultivate a
reputation over time for being in a certain price range. For example,
I know that in looking for a car it is sensible to look at the major29
Japanese imports, hut not worth while looking at Voivos or Mercedes
given nvesource We c-.'infcma1jze ejes ae a SOj]ifiedwv
by imagining thatafirmannounces a price, and that customers arrive
onits doorstep provided that they expect itto honor its
announcement.If the firm fails to honor its announcement, in future
periods it will not be believed.
Let Pe be the price expected by potential customers to prevail,
and let N be the number of customers that actually enter a firms
market. Then what we willsayisthat
(10) N =N(Pe)
LettingX be the quantity sold, we will then have a demand
function
(11)X =X(N,P)
Tosee the implications of this formulation, consider Figure 7.
Two dema:d curves are illustrated. The first, labelled DD, iswhatwe
mightcall tije cx ante curve: it represents the eventual quantity
sold if the expected price Pe is validated by the actual price P.
Corresponding to DD is a marginal revenue curve MR. Given marginal
cost C*/e, we show the profit—maximizing price given this demand
curve.30
Once customers have committed themselves to enteringthemarket
rr : : e a a - aat ai-rra ada r '-yeIill ataa
by the ex post' curve dd. Short run profit maximization would then
leadthe firm to charge a higher price than Pe, as shown by thefact
thatthe corresponding marginal revenue curve mr lies below marginal
cost when the price equals Pe. If the firm takes advantage of its full
short run market power in this way, however, the result will be that
customers will no longer believe its future announcements, and will
expect that the firm will always exploit its ex post monopoly power.
Provided that thediscount rate isnottoo high, the costof this loss
of reputation wIllexceedthe benefits of exploiting short runmarket
power, and the firm will thus choose to keep P =Pe.
How does this explain price stickiness? The answer seems clear
forincreases in marginal cost. An unexpected rise In marginal cost,
providedthat it is not too large, will be not be passed on in higher
prices so as not to lose reputation. Less obvious, perhaps, is that
aecreases inmarginalcost will also not be passed onIf they arenot
too large. The reason is that short—run marginal revenue lies below
marginal cost. withpriceincreases prevented by the need to retain
reputation. A fall in marginal cost that does not bring itbelow
short—run marginal revenuewilltherefore not provideanincentive to
cut the price; in effect, a firm will treat itasa windfall that
allows it to exploit short run monopoly power without breaking its
implicit promise not to charge a price in excess of Pe.31
In context, tIiis impliesa storysomething like the following: at
l-Riexcnii? ratessv)Europertr ranufactij( 'i3e
itslongrun profit maximizing price is S20,000. Itsshortrun profit
maximizing price would however be higher, because ex post demand is
less elastic than ex ante, so that if reputation were not an issue the
price would be $30,000. Now suppose that there is a rise in the dollar
that lowers marginal cost, so that the short run maxiiizing price is
$24,000. If this rise is not expected to persist, thefirm will not
find it worthwhile cultivating a reputation as a lower priced seller:
and the short run incentiveswillnot lead it to cut its price.
ninterestingfeature of this story is that itsuggeststhat
pricingtomarket will be more likely to happen where there are
substantial firm—specific costs to entering a market, so that ex ante
and ex post demand elasticities are very different. One might guess
that this will happen where buyers make occasional discrete purchases
ratherthan continuous small ones, and where the products are complex
anddifferentiated enough that the information costs of evaluating
qualityand thus interpreting prices are high. This combination of
features might explain why pricing to market is apparently confined to
themachinery and transport equipment sector.
IV. Conclusions32
IC) innrset tnI m '- 1H1jr.;C5 )'fj)-')
toiuxur Luooean automobiles.The aggregate estimates renorted iii
the first part of this paper suggest that 35 to 40 percent of the real
appreciation of the dollar since 1980 has been absorbed by foreign
exporters in a rise in their prices to the US compared with prices in
other markets. If the German case is representative, however, and if
the crude data are to be believed, the phenomenon of pricingtomarket
is not general but is specific to tne machiner and transport
equipment sector.
Explainingpricing to market is not as simple as one might hope.
It seems clear that a perfectly competitive model will not do the
trick. Static models of imperfect competition could explain it in
principle, but there are serious objections to both a simple
explanation in terms of price discriminating monopoly and a slightly
more complex explanation intermsof noncooperative oligopoly.
The best hope of understanding pricing to market therefore seems
to come from dynamic models of imperfect competition. At this point,
my preferred explanation would stress the roles of both supply
dynamics, resulting from the costs of rapidly adjusting the marketing
and distribution infrastructure needed to sell some imports, and
demand dynamics, resulting from the need of firms to invest in
reputation.33
'hatis needed at this point is not so much more theory as more
( Jilyfl- n-:t stepI h:\7e iftU frusoh pi ticulai
inciust'ies wnere it is possible both to construct better series on
pricing andto use institutional knowledge about the particulars of
industries to inform the assumptions of our models.34
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USX=Unitvalue of US manufactures exports
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6 =Basicmanufactures
7 =Machinesand transport equipment
8 =Miscellaneousmanufactured goods
Source: UN, Commodity Trade Statistics
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FIGUPI 6: Supply dynamics following exchange rate appreciation
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FIGURE 7:Pricingwithreputation
D
D
M
\
\
m
\
\
\
d
I
\
r